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The best evidence in favour of a claim to knowledge warranties not 
the possibility of our not being wrong, so says the sceptic. 
Whatever grounds a putative knower has for some claim, always 
there exists a gap between the grounds and the claim. Anti-
sceptical stands take the form of attempts either to bridge or close 
the gap. The Cartesian approach for bridging up the gap consists in 
specifying a guarantee for the subjective ground of beliefs that 
would secure them from sceptical attacks and elevate them to the 
status of knowledge. The guarantee is to be sought in the goodness 
of a deity, which by virtue of its sheer goodness will ensure our not 
being led into deception in matters of evidences for knowledge-
claims, provided our epistemic endowments are used responsibly. 
Some not satisfied with the Cartesian tradition sought the 
guarantee elsewhere—in some basic self-justifying and self-evident 
beliefs providing foundation to our system of beliefs, which 
conjoined with the evidences for our claims to knowledge make 
such claims immune to sceptical attacks.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant offered a 
foundationalist solution to sceptical challenge. According to Kant, 
we receive sensory data in space-time form. Upon the incoming 
spatio-temporal sensory data our minds impose a framework of 
concepts or categories, which transforms the data into experience 
properly so called. Experience is the result of applying the concepts 
to the sensory data. We justify our claims to knowledge as against 
the sceptic by pointing out to these facts about the way experience 
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is constituted. Kant said that for his own philosophical ideas he 
was indebted to Hume. Hume held that philosophical reason is 
impotent to refute scepticism, but this matters little, for human 
nature is so constituted that certain beliefs, such as the beliefs in the 
principle of induction, the existence of the external world, the 
causal relation obtaining between events in the world, are 
ineradicable. This view of Hume led Kant to build up his view that 
the concepts challenged by the sceptic are constitutive features of 
our capacity to have any experience at all.  
Wittgenstein in On Certainty offers a response to scepticism 
somewhat in the tradition of Hume and Kant, namely, that there 
are some things we simply have to accept in order to get on with 
our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. Such propositions as 
that there is an external world, or that the world came into 
existence a long time ago, are simply not open to doubt. It is not an 
option for us to question them, neither can we say that we know 
them, for these propositions constitute the framework of discourse 
within which more particular claims of knowledge and expressions 
of doubt make sense. In the following pages we will develop 
Wittgenstein‘s way of disposing of philosophical scepticism after 
his On Certainty.       
 In approaching scepticism, G. E. Moore‘s response to scepticism 
becomes Wittgenstein‘s target too. In response to the Cartesian 
sceptic‘s question whether we know that there are any physical 
objects, Moore in his article ‗Proof of an external world‘ claims to 
know that he has two hands while holding up his hand in good 
light and making a pointing gesture towards each of them in turn. 
It follows that at least two physical objects are known to exist. The 
fact that he knows these physical objects to exist adequately 
establishes that the external world comprised of such objects exists.  
In a later article, A Defence of Common Sense, Moore enumerates a 
number of propositions which he knows for certain: ―I have a 
body‖, ―The earth existed for a long time before my birth,‖ ―I have 
never been far from earth‘s surface‖ etc. Wittgenstein considers 
Moore‘s attack on the sceptic to be misplaced. Wittgenstein 
contends that when a person correctly uses ―I know,‖ he must have 
compelling grounds for this claim and be able to indicate to another 
what they are. Wittgenstein further contends that when ―I know‖ is 
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used correctly, those grounds cannot be less sure than the 
contention they are used to support. But the problem with 
propositions which Moore says he knows is that nothing is more 
certain than these propositions in normal circumstances. The 
proposition ―I have two hands‖ itself is as certain as any possible 
evidence to which Moore might appeal. That one has two hands is 
no less certain before having looked at them than afterwards. 
Should a person be asked whether he has two hands, he would not 
normally make sure by looking, since it is not plausible to think 
that he is more certain of his sight than he is of the existence of his 
hands. He could have tested his eyes by looking to find out 
whether he saw his hands. Therefore, in case of a claim to 
knowledge that one has two hands, no justification of a genuine 
sort is possible; there is no more rudimentary datum to which 
Moore can point in support (Martin, 1984, p. 594). Substantiation 
comes to an end. Since the grounds Moore can give in favour of his 
assertion that he has two hands are no surer than his assertion, he 
cannot claim to know the things he asserts.   
That Moore cannot claim to know the things he asserts does not 
mean that his propositions are subject to doubt. Any claim to doubt 
a proposition also requires sufficient grounds to support that claim. 
These grounds must be more certain than the proposition doubted, 
since otherwise one would have a better epistemic basis for 
rejecting the ground for doubt than for rejecting the proposition 
which is the target of the doubt. Consider entry 125 of On Certainty: 
If a blind man were to ask me ―Have you got two 
hands?‖ I should not make sure by looking. If I were 
to have any doubt of it, then I don‘t know why I 
should trust my eyes. For why shouldn‘t I test my 
eyes by looking to find out whether I see my two 
hands? What is to be tested by what? 
 Wittgenstein‘s argument here is that since nothing is more certain 
in normal circumstances than the proposition that one has two 
hands,  any doubt in this proposition is necessarily groundless, as 
any such ground (e.g., that one cannot see one‘s hands) will be at 
least as open to doubt as the target proposition. So, any ground for 
doubt in Moore type propositions would be itself more dubitable 
than the target proposition itself. Therefore, Moore type 
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propositions, those we are most certain of, are logically immune to 
rational doubt.  Hence not only is the Moorean claim to know such 
propositions improper, the sceptic‘s claim to  doubt such 
propositions cannot also be properly made.     
Propositions which Moore claims he knows are such that we are 
perfectly certain about them even in the absence of grounds 
adduced in their favor. As Wittgenstein says, the difficulty is to 
realize the groundlessness of our believing. The type of certainty 
that Wittgenstein is after is objective certainty. The certainty is 
objective as in not based on grounds at all. For once grounds are 
adduced, we are in the realm of knowledge and justification. This is 
a primitive and groundless sureness which constitute the 
fundamental principles of human enquiry. Our knowing 
something is not our ultimate way of being sure; it does not 
constitute our fundamental assurance about our world and 
ourselves. Underlying knowing is a more fundamental breed, a 
bedrock, a non-epistemic certainty. Knowledge is an epistemic 
concept, belonging to the language game. The certainties in 
Moore‘s repertoire are non-epistemic and stand in a 
presuppositional, supportive relationship to the language game.  
Certainties ground the language game and are conditions of its 
possibility. Knowledge in the end is based upon acknowledgement 
of a number of propositions which are fused into the foundations 
of our language games. What makes Moore type propositions 
certain is the fact that they perform a framework role in normal 
circumstances. Like rules of our language, these fundamental 
propositions are deeply embedded in all our speech and thought 
about the world.  They constitute the riverbed or frame work of our 
entire manner of making empirical judgments about what is true 
and false. Fundamental propositions are neither true nor false in 
the sense that these terms apply to ordinary propositions for which 
one submits evidence. Wittgenstein labels these propositions ‗hinge 
propositions‘. These propositions form the hinges around which 
our inquiries turn. The suggestion, then, is that these propositions 
are not aspects within the practice of inquiring, but rather in some 
way constitute it. They are not the result of but the underlying 
condition for the procedures we follow in our investigations. All 
our thinking and acting in the world is hinged on a framework of 
basic certainties that are not grounded on reason. The kinds of 
Ahinpunya Mitra                                      Rebutting Philosophical Scepticism 
39 
 
evidences which are acceptable, the possible doubts and questions 
to which one is entitled, etc., these depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, like hinges on which our 
other proceedings turn. But they themselves are so securely 
anchored in our method of doubt and enquiry that we cannot touch 
them. They are indubitable. Thus, if Moore‘s truths cannot be 
known, neither can they be placed in question.   
  
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of 
doubt, ordinary doubt and philosophical doubt. Ordinary 
doubting, like knowing, belongs to the language game. Doubt that 
belongs to the language game in principle has a terminal point, can 
be allayed by the adducing of evidence. Indian voters are by and 
large sceptical of the assurances given by the politicians before 
election. Voters do not put into doubt the physical existence of the 
politicians or their origin from the Homo Sapiens genus. Taking 
lessons from the past, they become sceptical about the realization of 
the present promises. This kind of doubt is acceptable to 
Wittgenstein; it belongs to language game and can be resolved. On 
the other hand,  from the fact that humans often err with respect to 
claims they advance, the philosophical sceptic goes on to argue that 
since in this case or in that case ( in any arbitrarily selected case) 
one might be mistaken, it is possible to be mistaken in every case. 
Without making any difference between cases—whether it is the 
existence of the external world or of other minds—philosophical 
scepticism imposes a philosophical picture on a diversity of 
features, absorbing their variety into the model that since one 
might be mistaken in any given case it follows that one might be 
mistaken in every case. Philosophical doubt, thus, in principle 
which goes on endlessly. Both Moore and his sceptical opponent 
have conflated the notion of doubt with ‗philosophical doubt.‘ 
What we call language game consists of linguistic practices giving 
rise to instructional rules that define certain concepts. Among these 
would be the concept of doubt. Doubting, like knowledge, is a part 
of conceptual scheme whose other members include guessing, 
hypothesizing, thinking, believing. They together form a web of 
intertwined and related notions that play roles in everyday human 
intercourse and interaction. Doubting is a social practice, a game. 
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Just like a game (for example, football)   cannot be played by 
simply looking inward, but through a certain kind of immersion in 
a human community like engagement in a set of complex activities 
that involve other persons and following a set of rules that are 
formative of the game, doubting is also part of a set of practices 
that are constitutive of human life.    
Let us analyse what Wittgenstein means by the ‗game of doubting.‘ 
Suppose my friend tells me that Bidesh Bose scored the goal for 
India against Poland in the 1984 Nehru Gold Cup Football 
tournament held at Eden Gardens. My recollection is that it was 
Bisawjit Bhattacharya, which gives me a reason to doubt the claim 
of my friend and to express my wavering. I have now just begun to 
play the game of doubting. The game is continued through my 
effort to find out the right answer, such as checking old news 
papers, going to libraries and checking clippings and 
encyclopaedias. This complex process is game because it involves a 
set of practices, the analogues of rules, such as record keeping, the 
adducing of evidence, and also involves others, institutions like 
libraries and a communal background that rests upon uniformity of 
judgement and agreement. The game ends with finding the right 
answer in these materials. When the right answer is now shown to 
my friend, it would be normal for him to accept my opinion. But, if 
he refuses to accept my report, the game is resumed, and he will be 
the player now, getting himself involved in a set of activities 
similar to what I did – going to libraries, checking records, and so 
on. If his consulting the various records testifies to the truth of my 
claim, the game is supposed to be over now.              
If, however, my friend goes on insisting that it was Bidesh Bose 
who scored the goal against Poland, arguing that the records are 
not trustworthy being based on a  mistaken source, he will be no 
longer playing a rational game following established community 
rules. Wittgenstein says in entry 625, ―But these rules …only make 
sense if they come to an end somewhere. A doubt without an end is 
not even a doubt.‖ Therefore, in the case of my friend, serious 
doubting has come to an end. My friend is now outside the 
language game. This is exactly the position of the sceptic who 
insists that it is reasonable to doubt the reliability of all puttive 
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data, including those based upon vision. This sort of obsessive 
doubt is what Wittgenstein calls ―philosophical doubt.‖ 
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein is against this extreme kind of 
scepticism which is by nature obsessive and non-terminating. In 
entry 315 he says, ―It would be as if someone were looking for 
some object in a room; he opens a drawer and doesn‘t see it there; 
then he closes it again, waits and opens it once more to see if 
perhaps it isn‘t there now, and keeps on like that. He has not 
learned to look for things...‖ The person who opens and closes the 
drawer again and again has not learned the game of searching. 
Such an obsessive process, just like the process of checking the date 
by looking at hundred copies of the same newspaper, lacks a 
procedure for closure, continues endlessly, and is therefore 
senseless. The game of searching should be learnt through early 
training, through living in a family as part of a community in 
which people search for lost objects. Such training makes one learn 
that it is senseless to go on opening and closing the drawer 
obsessively, since nothing can be gained after the first few tries. The 
person described here is demented. Since his behaviour is not in 
conformity with mankind, his doubting cannot be entertained. All 
of us grow up in a community and our behaviour is judged to be 
sensible or insane according to whether it conforms or not with the 
rules of such an assemblage. The obsessive sceptic is not behaving 
sensibly because his behaviour does not conform to the procedures 
of the community. A doubt is perfectly acceptable if it conforms to 
community practice. That would have been the case if the man‘s 
opening and closing the drawer would come to an end somewhere. 
Opening and closing the drawer endlessly is going beyond any 
recognizable community practice (practice of the act of doubting), 
and hence the man‘s suppositious worries are not doubts at all.  
The sceptical idea that we might always be mistaken is like the idea 
of miscalculating in all our calculations. In order to say sensibly 
that we have committed a mistake in calculation, we need to 
contrast the case with one in which no mistake has been made. 
With this sort of contrast in hand, the notion that we have 
miscalculated in this or that case makes sense. If we press our 
doubts and ask whether it is possible that we have miscalculated in 
all of our calculations, it would not be a sensible position. In the 
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same way, the hypothesis that all things around us do not exist, 
which entails that we are wholly wrong about every statement we 
make about physical objects, is not sensible. In doubting all of our 
calculations and, by analogy, in doubting every statement about 
physical objects, one is not playing the right game, namely, the 
―doubting game‖. One is no longer playing according to the rules 
of the language game that define the concept of doubting. 
According to the logic of the language game, the sensible 
employment of doubt entails that in principle all doubts are 
resolvable; they cannot sensibly be expressed ad infinitum. As 
Wittgenstein writes in entry 115, ―The game of doubting itself 
presupposes certainty.‖ He also puts it: ―Doubting and non-
doubting behavior. There is the first only if there is the second‖ 
(OC, 354). In actual practice we do not doubt everything: ―The 
reasonable man does not have certain doubts‖ (OC, 220). This is 
how language game is actually played.  A language game is 
possible if one trusts something (OC, 509).  In so trusting, one has 
no thought about verification. Our language with all its games rests 
upon our certainty about some fundamental propositions. 
Knowledge, guessing, hypothesizing, thinking, believing, and 
doubting—these are epistemic concepts belonging to the language 
game. They together form a conceptual scheme. Moorian certainty 
does not belong to this system; it stands outside of it. Certainty 
grounds the language game; it is a condition that makes the 
language game, that is, this set of activities, possible.  If one's 
ordinary actions were always preceded by or accompanied by 
doubt, one would be paralyzed—one would stand before the abyss, 
and ordinary behavior would be impossible. If we doubted 
everything, even the meanings of the words we use in normal 
circumstances, thus dragging out the language-game by 
unremitting doubt, we would soon do away with the language 
game itself, we could not even talk. Accordingly, we will loose our 
ability to understand the doubt itself. 
The sceptical move from any case to every case would be 
equivalent to the claim that a game has always been played wrong. 
In entry 496, Wittgenstein says that it has no meaning to say that a 
game has always been played wrong. Consider, for example, the 
game of chess. The game has been played innumerable times for 
centuries. Suppose that a scholar somehow detects that the first 
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book describing the game of chess written by the inventor of the 
game contained a misprint regarding one of the rules that affected 
the meaning of the rule, and that the mistake has continued in all 
subsequent works on the subject. Since one of the real rules has 
never been followed, the scholar concludes that the game of chess 
has always been played incorrectly. The players playing the game 
of chess would reject the contention as irrelevant. For centuries 
they have followed a practice, and that practice, even it involves 
the following of a wrong rule, has become a history. The historical 
practice of the game of chess defines what the game is, and one 
who follows that practice is playing correctly. Accordingly, the 
scholar‘s contention that the game of chess has always been played 
incorrectly is unacceptable. The sceptic, in putting to question the 
historical practices that define chess playing, is not asking a 
sensible question at all. Similarly, raising questions about the 
traditional procedures that define calculating, and about our 
communal linguistic rules that define what it is to refer to such 
things as tables and chairs, is to indulge in nonsense.   
At one time, there was some doubt whether a planet existed in a 
certain portion of space-time. Later observations proved that it 
existed, and this planet was later named ―Saturn.‖ But the situation 
with respect to the existence of Moore‘s hand is palpably different 
from the situation with respect to the existence of Saturn. Since 
Moore was born, never it was doubted by anyone, even when he 
hadn‘t offered his proof, whether his hand existed. The possibility 
of committing mistake gets more and more improbable as we 
approximate from the case of the planet to that of our hand. As 
Wittgenstein says, ―Doubt gradually loses its sense. The language-
game just is like that‖ (OC 56). At some point in the transition from 
the planet case to that of our hand, the mistake ceases to be 
conceivable.  This is the case with a vast number of propositions 
which count certain for us, including Moore‘s truisms. With respect 
to earth‘s existence etc., Wittgenstein says, we have reached the 
bedrock. There is no possible way in which one can be mistaken 
about certainties like ‗The world exists,‘ ‗I have a body,‘ ‗There are 
others such as ourselves,‘ ‗I am here.‘ What is important about 
Moore‘s truisms is that they are propositions which stands fast for 
us even without testing. We cannot be mistaken about what stands 
fast for all of us. Somewhere we must begin with not doubting with 
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certainty. Moore-type propositions serve as the framework by 
which we can speak about the objects of the world. They have 
constituted the scaffolding of human thought for unthinkable ages. 
They are the ‗substratum of all my enquiry and asserting‘ (OC 162). 
This substratum is a resting place; a place of no questions and no 
doubts, where our spade is turned, where we rest content. 
Underlying the hurly-burly of our hesitations, investigations and 
measurements lies the rock bottom of our conviction. This is the 
point of ultimate trust. From here we get our start. 
The common sense framework is not a theory; it is our inherited 
background. What Wittgenstein takes to be foundational is a 
picture of the world we have implicitly assimilated, taken on as our 
own, inherited as members of the human community from our 
parents and environment, from generations of human life.  We 
have been trained from birth in ways of acting that are 
nonreflective to accept a picture of the world that is ruthlessly 
realistic: that there is an earth, persons on it, objects in our 
environment, and so forth (Stroll, 1994, p.158). In the course of our 
daily lives we absorb such matters unreflectively and 
unselfconsciously. We implicitly adopt the certainty that an 
external world exists in order to take part in the language game of 
talking about physical objects. That I have a body, that there exist 
people other than myself, that humans cannot vanish into thin air—
these are animal-like or instinctual certainty that is never taught, or 
even articulated as such. They are ‗there like our life‘ (OC, 559). I 
have never learned that I have a body, nor have I paused to 
consider, check or, test whether I had a body. My certainty about 
having a body did not await propositional formulation or any kind 
of focused awareness at all; it goes with having a body. I am certain 
of having a body in that I live and act embodied: I use my hands, 
speak, walk and eat. Here, to be certain does not imply that one can 
formulate the sentences or even understand the words that 
compose them. A one-year-old child not yet in possession of 
language shows that she is endowed with such certainties by using 
her body, interacting with others, running away from a barking 
dog rather than sitting there waiting to vanish, and so on. (Moyal-
Sharrock, 2004, p. 104) Propositions which lie at the foundations are 
mostly gulped down without mention and in the course of learning 
many other things. Wittgenstein says in entry 143: 
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I am told, for example, that someone climbed this 
mountain many years ago. Do I always enquire into 
the reliability of the teller of this story, and whether 
the mountain did exist years ago? A child learns 
there are reliable and unreliable informants much 
later than it learns facts which are told it. It doesn't 
learn at all that that mountain has existed for a long 
time: that is, the question whether it is so doesn't 
arise at all. It swallows this consequence down, so to 
speak, together with what it learns.         
Wittgenstein's claim is that our common sense system of beliefs—
our inherited background—is not revisable or modifiable. Consider 
the following passage: 
Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes 
experiments with substances in his laboratory and 
now he concludes that this and that takes place 
when there is burning. He does not say that it might 
happen otherwise, another time. He has got hold of 
a definite world-picture—not of course one that he 
invented: he learned it as a child. I say world-picture 
and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-
course foundation for his research and as such also 
goes unmentioned.  
       (OC, 167) 
What Wittgenstein wants to establish here is that the world-picture 
that Lavoisier has got hold of supports his chemical investigations 
rather than getting overturned by their findings. His entire enquiry 
is based on certainties which he has not tested and would not think 
of testing: he has eyes which do not normally deceive him, he lives 
in a world inhabited by scientists and nonscientists, he will in some 
not-too-distant future need to eat and to sleep, etc. Investigative 
activities of science rest upon the foundations upon which are 
exempt from doubt: proof, justification, and therefore revision. 
However much Einstein‘s findings modified Newton‘s laws of 
motions, neither of these thinkers denied the existence of earth. 
The sceptic holds that the commonsense framework is revisable in 
principle, and that such revisability implies the non-existence of 
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certainty. Wittgenstein's position, as just discussed above, is that 
such propositions as ―The earth has existed for many years past‖ 
and ―I am a human being‖ are not revisable in the light of future 
experience. If these foundational propositions were imagined to be 
false, the changes it would involve in our conceptual system would 
be incomprehensible to us. It would be like the case if it was 
somehow discovered, say, by persons of another planet, that the 
earth came into existence two years ago, and that human beings 
were suffering from some pervasive distortion of the nature of time 
due to which they were deluded into thinking that such 
investigative activities as history and anthropology are really about 
distant past events.  Such a hypothesis is logically consistent. It 
does not involve a logical contradiction of the kind ―Some 
bachelors are married‖ (Stroll, 1994, p. 153). But such a hypothesis 
would make us abandon our entire explanatory system. As 
Wittgenstein says, any such revision would amount to the 
annihilation of all yardsticks (OC, 492). Our whole belief system 
will be plunged into chaos. It is not like the modification of 
Newtonian mechanics that the Einsteinian revolution effected. The 
existence of the earth and the communities which nurture us are 
not like pieces of apparatus that can be discarded or repaired if 
they do not work correctly. The notion of working correctly has no 
application to these cases. We cannot revise, alter, or question the 
existence of the earth. Earth and the communities that live on it 
stand absolutely fast. Since there is something that stands fast and 
is not revisable, the sceptic is mistaken in that respect as well.  
When someone makes a mistake, this can be fitted into what he 
already knows aright. We may err in adding a long string of 
numbers, and this error fits into the normal pattern of human 
activity. We have followed the normal counting procedure, and in 
following it, we have run astray at some point. It is a mistake, and 
this misjudgement has been made in conformity with mankind. 
Occurrence of the mistake here presupposes that the individual 
making that mistake knows how to get that sort of thing right 
(Soles, 1982, p. 560). But we cannot be mistaken, in this sense, of the 
hinge propositions, of which we are objectively certain. Someone 
who believes that he is sitting in his room when he is not or 
seriously poses doubt of the existence of the world he has inherited 
is not making a mistake; rather he is suffering from a mental 
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disturbance, a conceptual aberration. He will not be recognized by 
others to be in a position to get it right. He is knocking from under 
our feet the ground on which we stand in making judgments at all. 
Hinges are our bounds of sense. They condition our making sense. 
The hinge ―There exist people other than myself‖ is a condition 
necessary for the use and understanding of the sense of such 
descriptive or informative statements as ‗The world‘s population 
doubled between 1950 and 1990‘ (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p. 105). ‗I 
am alive‘ is a bound of sense that ineffably underpins our thinking 
and acting in the world. A transgression of such bounds of sense, 
thinking or acting in the certainty that we might be dead or 
someone who died is now living, is a manifestation of madness. 
Our life, our deeds, show that we do not, cannot doubt some things 
if we are to make sense. Rejection of these bounds of sense is 
logically impossible, since without them we, human beings, drift 
into nonsense. In Wittgenstein‘s diagnosis then, philosophical 
scepticism is not merely false, but aberrant. Rebutting scepticism in 
this way is Wittgenstein‘s greatest achievement in the field of 
epistemology, a course that had not been followed by any previous 
philosopher. It is for this reason that it is being claimed in many 
circles that On Certainty is the most important contribution to 
epistemology since Kant‘s First Critique. 
 
As On Certainty progresses, there grows the deepening insight that 
certainty itself must be understood in non-propositional ways. 
Objective certainty is a sureness, a trust that is not prefaced by a 
precursory thought or hesitation. It is not a justified or pondered 
assurance we come to from reasoning, observation or research. 
Basic certainties are not indubitable or self-justified propositions, 
but animal certainties. It is a non-raciocinated and unconscious trust 
that we share with neonates and animals. It is animal not in the 
sense of being brute impression, but in being unreflective. Their 
being non-reflective or animal invites us to think of these certainties 
in non-propositional terms. That physical objects exist needs no 
more justification than does the squirrel‘s instinctive gathering of 
nuts for the winter. The reason we put these animal certainties into 
words is at best heuristic. That is, we do it for philosophical 
analysis,  the kind of thing that Moore and Wittgenstein were 
Tattva- Journal of Philosophy                                                       ISSN 0975-332X 
48 
 
doing, or for linguistic instruction, such as a parent does who 
teaches his child: ‗This is (what we call) a hand‘. The only mode of 
the occurrence of objective certainty is that of showing, not of 
saying. It shows itself in the decisions and actions of human 
behaviour, in the ‗give-and-take of human existence‘ (Gill, 1974, p. 
284). Our hinge certainty that ‗there are physical objects‘ shows 
itself in our reaching out to pick a flower. We show our certainty 
about ‗This is a hand‘ in the way we act with and speak about this 
hand, for example, in our drawing a land-scape, or in our saying: ‗I 
have cut my hand.‘ The hinge certainty verbalized as: ‗I have a 
body‘ is a disposition which manifests itself in my acting in the 
certainty of having a body, for example, in my eating, running and  
resisting myself from taking an attempt  to penetrate the walls in 
the spirit of  a disembodied ghost. The occurrence of certainty 
resembles an instinctive reaction or automatic behaviour. Hinge 
certainty takes the form of spontaneous acting in the certainty of an 
innumerable number of things.  It exhibits itself in the ongoing 
smoothness of our normal, basic operating in the world. This 
certainty is akin to a direct taking hold or thought-less grasp. This 
trust is not experienced as a trust, but rather shows itself in the 
absence of mistrust, in our directly ‗taking hold‘ of something 
without any doubts, as when in ordinary circumstance we take 
hold of a towel without any preliminary hesitation and making 
sure that ‗the towel is there‘.  
On Wittgenstein‘s view, then, the world is not primitively 
embraceable in thought. We take hold of it non-intellectually. In 
hinge perception, no epistemic route is followed, and therefore no 
epistemic fault can occur. There is no epistemic gap in these cases 
that can be infiltrated by hesitation, doubt, verification. Since in 
hinge perception, one is objectively, not empirically, certain of what 
it is one perceives, there is no possibility of a mistake. There is a 
natural continuity here, and therefore no actual gap between 
propositions which relate to our sense-impressions and 
propositions which relate to physical objects to be bridged and 
subsequently explained by philosophers. At the origin of our 
knowledge, there are no such preliminaries as proposition, 
judgment and inference, but spontaneity, automatism, rule, reflex 
and instinct. Here, our passage is not from the proposition to the 
deed. Rather, from a natural, non reflective grasp we enter the 
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realm of sophistication, reflection and hesitating pondering. From 
doing to thinking. Going in this direction will not make us 
encounter any inexplicable gap between our thinking and our 
acting. No epistemic intermediaries, no protocol or observation 
statements intervenes between our perceiving the world and our 
grasping it. (Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, p.10).  Sceptics overlook the 
spontaneity of our beginnings.  
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